The model presented in this paper is the first of a new generation of evolutionary
other social scientists. These models reflect two beliefs on our part. One is that the first generation of mostly very general economic evolutionary models has run into diminishing returns. The other is our strong commitment to the argument that the design of formal economic models ought to proceed well informed by the empirical literature on the subject matter they purport to address.
What we call here first-generation formal economic evolutionary models have generally been highly stylized. A few of them have aimed to be consistent with, and to explain, certain well-defined empirical phenomena. 1 But most of them have not been closely targeted at empirical phenomena. Rather they were designed to explore the logic of economic evolutionary processes, to explore major topics such as economic growth, industrial dynamics, the relationship between market structure and innovation or the diffusion process, and to test and demonstrate the feasibility of the art form. Some of these models are highly complex, but pay little attention to the empirical reality they purport to model. It is our belief that, while the collection of evolutionary models so far has greatly increased our understanding of evolutionary processes in economics, this enterprise has been experiencing somewhat diminishing returns.
We think that it now is time to try to fulfil one of the arguments made by many evolutionary scholars that formal evolutionary theory can be a major help in empirical research in economics. In our case, that belief rests on a particular position regarding the nature of fruitful theorizing in economics. We think that one of the most important roles of formal theorizing in economics is to engage in dialogue with the arguments presenting causal explanations of observed patterns of economic phenomena put forth by empirical researchers on a subject. We have called such empirically oriented explanations 'appreciative' theory. Appreciative theory is real causal theory, and in most cases reflects what the analyst believes is really going on. However, as conventionally presented, appreciative theory generally is not well suited for logical exploration regarding whether the causal arguments put forth are consistent (and if so whether they are sufficient to provide an explanation) or whether they need to be augmented in certain ways. In contrast, formal theory is more distant from the empirical subject matter, more abstract and more amenable to logical examination. Economists who know the empirical subject matter well seldom take formal theory seriously as the explanation they believe. But on the other hand formal theory can be 'History-friendly' Models of Industry Evolution 4 a great help in thinking through the appreciative theory. It can identify gaps in the logic and can lead to the consideration of mechanisms and factors that initially are missing, or muted, in the more informal account. Formal modeling also can lead to insights about the key variables and relationships that were not clear in the more informal accounts.
By 'history-friendly' evolutionary economic modeling we mean formal models that aim to capture the gist of the appreciative theory put forth by analysts of the history of an industry or a technology, and thus to enable its logical exploration. The term 'formal' means that all of the logic that drives model outcomes is explicit and at least potentially on display, a characteristic shared by simulation models and analytical models.
The above discussion signals that there is a tension in formal modeling done for this purpose between 'getting close to the appreciative theoretic story', and having a model whose mechanisms are not opaque. To be useful in the role we describe, the formal model must be capable of faithful representation of the verbal argument, at least in stylized form. In general that verbal argument is sufficiently complicated that a simulation model is the only way through which its gist can be captured formally. This is particularly so if, as in the particular cases under consideration here, that verbal logic involves non-linear dynamics in an essential way. But if the central purpose of developing a formal model is to check or firm up the logical consistency of the appreciative theory, it is important to be able to understand just how the model works. In particularly, if early versions of the model do not work as expected, suggesting that there are gaps or flaws in the appreciative theory or its formal counterpart, it is important that the mechanisms built into the formal modeling be transparent enough so that the analyst can figure out just what is wrong about, or incomplete in, the appreciative theoretic account and/or its formal representation. On the other hand, developing and working through a formal theory may bring to mind mechanisms, factors and constraints that were missing in the initial appreciative account, but only if the model is understandable. The creation of formal representations that facilitate these objectives and satisfy these criteria is a difficult challenge.
Of course, a fruitful dialogue goes two ways. What is learned in formal modeling can provide very useful stimulus to empirical research and to appreciative theorizing. But, again, this only will happen if the formal model is, at once, recognized by the empirical research community as representing an accurate, if stylized, version of their beliefs, and if, at the same time, the logic of the formal model is understandable.
We believe more generally that our 'history-friendly' models will prove stimulating and useful to economists, other social scientists, scholars of business organization and strategy, and historians, who are interested in how industries and technologies evolve and in the factors affecting this evolution. History-friendly models could touch a wide range of issues and be used in a number of ways. Let us take, for example, industrial economics. In addition to the main issues discussed above, there are other beneficial uses. Once developed for several industries and technologies, these models can allow comparative analyses of patterns of industrial dynamics and technological change common to several industries and technologies, and an understanding of some general factors causing them. In addition these models can focus on the role of institutions and on public policy in industry and technological evolution, and then allow for in-depth analysis of the role of specific institutional settings or public policy. Finally, history-friendly models allow one to answer traditional industrial organization questions-such as the determinants of vertical integration and diversification, the role of first-mover advantages, the consequence of entry on industry structure and dynamicsgrounded in industry evolution and with a process and coevolutionary view. Similar reasoning can be done for the use of history-friendly models in other social sciences or in the analysis of technology.
We also hope our general methodological approach will be interesting and thought provoking to scholars who have been pondering the uses and abuses of formal modeling in the social sciences.
The history-friendly model presented in this paper is focused on the long-term evolution of the computer industry, and in particular on the birth and early growth of the new industry (related to mainframes) and on the subsequent emergence of the personal computer segment. In Section 2 we briefly discuss the history of the computer industry and the challenges for history-friendly modeling. In Section 3 we present the model. In Sections 4 and 5 we run some history-replicating and history-divergent simulations, and discuss the major factors affecting the specific evolution of the computer industry and competition among firms. In Section 6 we draw some final conclusions.
The Evolution of Computer Technology and the Computer Industry
Given space constraints, we can recount only a stylized history of computer technology and the computer industry. The story draws heavily from more detailed analytic historical accounts by Flamm (1988) , Langlois (1990) , Bresnahan and Greenstein (1999) , and especially Bresnahan and Malerba (1999) .
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An essential element of the story involves the pattern of technological change. The history of the computer shows continuous improvements in machines that serve particular groups of users, punctuated from time to time by the introduction of significant new component technologies which not only permit the needs of existing users to be met better, but also open up the possibility of designing machines that serve new classes of users whose needs could not be met using older technology. In the USA these punctuations were associated with the entry into the industry of new firms, and these new firms almost always were the first to venture into the new market. However, this happened to a significant lesser degree in Europe, and hardly at all in Japan.
A Stylized History
The evolution of the industry divides rather naturally into four eras. The first began with early experimentation with computers and culminated in designs sufficiently attractive to induce their purchase by large firms with massive computation tasks, as well as by scientific laboratories. This opened the era of the mainframe computer. The second era began with the introduction of integrated circuits and the development of minicomputers. The third era is that of the personal computer, made possible by the invention of the microprocessor. We now are in the era of networked PCs and the increasing use of the Internet.
During World War II and the years just after, governments in several countries funded a number of projects with the aim of developing computers useful for governmental purposes. In the late 1940s and early 1950s a number of companies, in Europe as well as in the USA, began investing their own funds hoping to develop a computer sufficiently attractive to win sales from the scientific community, large firms and other organizations with large-scale computation needs. The early 1950s saw the entry into the industry of IBM-then a major punched-card and tabulating machinery company, but with significant capabilities in electronic computing derived in good part from government R&D contracts-and the rest of the 'Bunch' (Burrows, Univac Rand, NCR, Control Data, Honeywell), as well as GE and RCA. These companies differed in the strategies they took, and in their success in developing machines that would sell at a profit. By 1954, with the introduction of the 650, IBM began to pull ahead of the Bunch, and, with the introduction of the 1401 in 1960, came to dominate the world market for accounting machines.
IBM dominated not only the US market, but also Europe and Japan. A small-scale domestic industry was able to hold on in Europe, and later in 'History-friendly' Models of Industry Evolution Japan, only by virtue of a combination of government subsidy, a guaranteed government market and protection.
Component technology improved greatly during the mainframe era, and transistors gradually replaced vacuum tubes as the basic circuit elements. These developments enabled significant improvements in mainframe performance, and some reduction in cost. In the early 1960s IBM introduced its 360 family of models, and seized an even larger share of the mainframe market.
The invention and development of the integrated circuit enabled even further improvements in mainframe computers and also reduced barriers to entry in the mainframe industry, thus stimulating the entry of new competitors to IBM. However, integrated circuits not only permitted large computers to be made even more powerful, but also opened the possibility of designing very powerful computers that could be produced at a much lower cost than mainframes. DEC's PDP8, the first minicomputer, was produced in 1965. Minicomputers opened up a new demand class-which included medium-sized research laboratories, manufacturing firms and some small businesses-that had not been tapped by mainframes.
In the USA new firms, like DEC, were the first into the new minicomputer market; these new firms seized and held a significant share of that market. IBM lagged in getting into minicomputers, and never achieved there the dominance it achieved in the mainframe market. While the availability of integrated circuits provided an opportunity for European and Japanese firms to get into the minicomputer market, as in the earlier case with mainframes, firms in Europe and Japan lagged. US firms took a considerable fraction of the minicomputer market in Europe and Japan, and domestic firms held on there only through a combination of subsidy and protection.
The introduction of the microprocessor marked another punctuation in the history of the industry. Microprocessors enabled significant improvements in mainframe and minicomputer designs. However, their most important impact was to permit the design of reasonably powerful computers that could be produced at quite low cost. Personal computers opened up a new demand class which had not been touched by mainframes and minicomputers: small firms and personal users.
As in the case of minicomputers, in the USA new firms entered the industry, aiming to serve the new personal computer (PC) market: these included prominently specialized PC design and manufacturing firms (such as Apple, Commodore, Tandy and Compaq). Established mainframe and minicomputer producers were slow in seeing the new market and the needs of users in that market. Interestingly, when IBM did get into PCs, it did so with external 'History-friendly' Models of Industry Evolution alliances: Microsoft for operating systems software, and Intel for microprocessors. IBM did manage to seize a significant fraction of the PC market, but was never as dominant there as it had been in mainframes. And, of course, in recent years IBM's share in PCs has eroded significantly.
A striking characteristic of the firms producing PCs is that they are primarily assemblers, buying most of their components on the open market. Also, most of the software for personal computers is developed and supplied by software specialists. This is in sharp contrast to mainframe production, particularly in the early and middle stages of the industry. IBM not only designed and produced most of the critical components for its mainframes, but also wrote most of the basic software. For a time, IBM also designed and produced a significant fraction of the integrated circuits that were employed in its mainframes. In minicomputers there was, from the beginning, more vertical specialization than in mainframe production, with most minicomputer companies buying their integrated circuits, and a number of other key components, on the open market. But PCs have seen even more vertical disintegration.
As noted, the advent of PCs led, in the USA, to the birth of a number of new firms, several of which turned out to be very successful. In contrast, just as in the case of minicomputers, in Europe and Japan few firms entered. And, except where there was heavy government protection or subsidy, American firms have come to dominate foreign markets for personal computers.
These technological and market characteristics are even more emphasized in the new era-that of networked PCs and the Internet-in which specialized firms compete in market layers (microprocessors, other components, printers, computer disks, operating software, application software, etc.) connected through open standards and interfaces. In this period we have a divided technological and market leadership among several firms, each of which may be a prominent actor in a specific market segment.
Challenges for History-friendly Modeling
There are at least three interesting challenges for history-friendly modeling in the account of the industry recounted above. One is the explanation of the characteristics and the changes in the structure of the industry over time, in particular as new technologies were introduced and new markets emerged. The evolution of market structure has been marked by the following elements. A dominant firm emerged relatively early in the history of the industry, and that firm held its grip on the market share in the segment of the market it first seized in the face of several 'competence destroying' (Tushman 'History-friendly' Models of Industry Evolution and Anderson, 1986; Henderson and Clark, 1990) technological changes. On the other hand, new firms (and not the established ones) have been the vehicles through which new technologies opened up new market segments. The old established leaders have also entered the new market but have been unable to shut the newcomers out of the new markets. A second challenge is provided by the progressive vertical disintegration of the computer industry, and in particular by the sharp increase in specialization that has marked the era of PCs. Still a third challenge is to explain the significant differences between the characteristics, changes and performance of the industry in the USA on the one hand, and Europe and Japan on the other, particularly with respect to the role of incumbents and the ability of new firms to take advantage of new technological and market opportunities.
In this paper we focus only on the first challenge. The verbal histories of the industry provide a sketch of a theory of why incumbent firms have been able to hold off newcomers with new technology in their traditional market, but have not be able to seize new market opportunities. In the model we present below we have tried to present some of that verbal argument in stylized form.
The Model
In this section we lay out the basic model. Given the nature of complex simulation models, it is impossible to present all the details of all the equations without befuddling the reader and obscuring the basic logic of the model. We have tried, therefore, to lay out in transparent form what we regard as the gist of the model. Interested readers may obtain a full copy of the simulation model by writing to the authors.
The Topography
In this model we consider a single stylized episode of the sort under consideration. At the start of the episode, there is a single component technology, which we will call 'transistor' technology, which has the promise of enabling useful computers. Later, a new component technology, which we will call 'microprocessor', comes into existence. The potential purchasers of computers value two attributes: (i) the 'performance' of the computer; and (ii) its price, or 'cheapness'. The desirability of any computer design can be summarized in terms of how it rates in those two dimensions of Lancaster attribute space. By a 'useful computer' we mean one that meets threshold requirements of potential purchasers. More on this shortly.
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Each of the component technologies is associated with outer limits on what computers incorporating them can achieve in the two relevant dimensions. For analytic convenience, we have treated those technological constraints as defining a rectangular box. Thus in Figure 1 the two boxes depict the set of technological characteristics that can potentially be achieved in computers designed around transistor and microprocessor component technologies. Note that the use of microprocessors permits computers to be designed that are better than transistor-based computers regarding both performance and cheapness. However, the most dramatic improvement that is permitted by the incorporation of microprocessors lies in the cheapness direction.
Those outer limits of what is feasible under the two technologies are 'potentials'. The potential is not achievable, however, without significant investment of resources in research and development, and requires learning from experience. The first efforts of a new firm trying to design a computer using transistors, or (later) microprocessors, will only be able to achieve a design characterized by point Z (for zero experience). We will specify the dynamics of design improvement built into the model in Section 3.2.
On the demand side, there are two quite separate groups of potential customers. One group, which we will call 'large firms', greatly values 'performance' and wants to buy 'mainframes'. The second group, which we will call 'individuals' or 'small users', has less need for high performance but values 'cheapness'. They provide a potential market for 'personal computers'.
Each of our two user groups requires a minimum level of performance and cheapness before they can be enticed to buy any computers at all. Once threshold characteristics are reached, the value that customers place on a computer design is an increasing function of its performance and its cheapness. In Figure 2 we depict the preferences of 'big firms' and 'small users' respectively. The difference in the demands of the two user groups, 'History-friendly' Models of Industry Evolution which we specified above, is reflected in both the difference in threshold requirements and in the indifference curves.
If one overlays Figure 2 onto Figure 1 , one can note that even if computers achieve the outer limits permitted by transistor technology, the threshold requirements of small users will not be met. Thus the design of computers that can successfully enter the PC market depends on the availability of microprocessors.
The 'indifference curves' of Figure 2 depict designs of equal value or 'merit' in the eyes of the two customer groups. We assume that higher computer merit translates into more computers bought by customers. We shall develop the details in Section 3.3.
The above discussion indicates clearly some of the broad outlines of what one would expect to see in a simulated industry history, and also points to some of the matters that need to be treated in specification of the dynamics. Assuming that there is some way that firms can obtain funds, computer technology will start out at Z. Over time, and with R&D spending, computer designs will improve until ultimately they crack through the threshold requirements of the 'mainframe market'. Then firms that have achieved threshold-meeting designs will begin to make sales. As computers improve, sales will grow. The introduction of microprocessors will open the potential of meeting mainframe demands even better, and of designing machines that will sell on the PC market. Firms that try to pursue those possibilities will need some funding in order to do that because, initially at least, no one will buy their wares. However, ultimately one would expect that microprocessor computers would take over the mainframe market, and be able to tap the new PC market. 
Box 1 Firms, Competencies and Innovation Dynamics
In the model, firms are represented by sets of technological and marketing competencies that are accumulated over time, and by rules of action. The focal competencies in the model are design capabilities: by building incrementally on their past achievements and by accumulating experience, engineers produce successive generations of computers with superior cost/performance attributes. Other actions reflected in the model of the firm concern the pricing of products, R&D and advertising expenditures, the adoption of new technologies and diversification into new markets. There is no explicit representation of production per se, or of investments in capacity. It is assumed that the requisite production capabilities can be hired at a price per computer that reflects the 'cheapness' attribute of the design.
Design outcomes are influenced by firm-specific strategies represented by choices of search direction in the capabilities space, and also by latent technological opportunities. Firms are born with different, randomly selected trajectories of technological improvement along the two technological dimensions: costs and performance. In order to capture-in an extreme form-the notion that competencies cannot be changed rapidly and costlessly, in the model it is assumed that this trajectory is firm-specific and time-invariant.
As firms spend on R&D, they accumulate technical competencies. Technical progress is represented in the model as a change in a computer design along the two technical dimensions, generated by the application of these firm-specific competencies. Technical competencies are represented as a stock that grows over time as a result of R&D expenditures. One can think of competencies as reflecting the shared experience of two types of 'engineers': cost-oriented and performance-oriented engineers. Their mix is defined by the technological trajectory that characterizes each firm. As time goes by, firms hire new engineers, maintaining constant at any period the proportion between the two types and hence the trajectory of advance.
In each period t, R&D expenditures, R t , are used to pay the stock of engineers of last period, R t-1 . For each of the two design dimensions, if the share of total R&D allocated to one particular type of engineers R 
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We now turn to explicit dynamics.
Innovation Dynamics
When transistors, and later microprocessors, come into existence, firms have to learn how to design effective computers using these new components. Firms gradually develop competence in using the new technology as a result of the R&D investments they make, and the experience they accumulate. Our model of firm learning is meant to capture significant elements of the 'dynamic competence' theory of the firm that has been developed by Winter (1987) , Dosi and Marengo (1993) and Teece et al. (1992 Teece et al. ( , 1996 . Our model is also designed to incorporate the fact that in this industry, and in a number of others, a considerable period may go by after a firm starts trying to operate in a new technology before it is able to sell any product, if it ever achieves that. At the start it must have external financing.
Thus at the beginning of our episode, with the introduction of transistors, we assume that there are a number of firms, endowed by 'venture capitalists' with an initial budget to spend on R&D, who hope to exploit the new technological opportunities. All firms start with the same initial design capabilities, depicted by Z in Figure 1 , and perhaps interpretable as the design characteristics that have been achieved by experimental computers that are in the public domain. Firms start off with randomly assigned initial budgets, which they spend in equal amounts over a prespecified number of periods. Reflecting their bets regarding what is technologically easy and difficult, and what the market will buy, firms assign different fractions of their 'annual' R&D budget to efforts to improve on performance, and to reduce the production costs of a computer. Thus, after the initial period, the firms in the engineeers are fired. If R i t < 0.9R i t-1 , the budget B (see Box 2) is used to pay for the difference.
Advertising expenditures are considered in a very similar way to R&D expenditures in that they produce marketing competencies that are accumulated over time. If firms do not invest, their advertising capabilities deteriorate over time-and hence the size of the advertising expenditures effect decreases, for any given amount of expenditure. Moreover, the impact of advertising expenditures is not constant, but follows a logistic curve (see Box 3).
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From period to period, the quality of the design that a company is able to achieve in each relevant dimension-performance and cheapness-improves according to the following equation:
The first variable, R, is the firm's R&D expenditure aimed at achieving design improvements of a particular sort, where i = 1 denotes performance and i = 2 denotes cheapness. That expenditure allows the firm to maintain a given stock of engineers dedicated to advancing computer design in the two relevant dimensions. That expenditure, in turn, is a constant fraction of its period-by-period R&D expenditures in total. The fraction reflects the firm's 'bet' as to the most useful direction to proceed. As we noted, a firm's total R&D expenditure per period is a constant fraction of the total funds lent to it by its venture capital financiers. After that initial loan is drawn down, a firm has either achieved a commercially viable design or is out of business. The second variable, T, is the number of periods that the firm has been working with a particular technology, in this case transistors. For all firms that start with a technology at the same time, this second variable will be the same. However, when later in this exposition we begin to describe the evolution of computers employing microprocessor technology, firms will differ regarding the times when they get into that technology, and thus in that technology there will be differences across firms in this experience variable.
The third variable in the equation, L i -X i , is the distance of the achieved design to the frontier. As what is achieved comes closer and closer to the limits of what is achievable, a given R&D expenditure will make less and less progress. There also is a random element to what a firm achieves, e.
As indicated, if a firm runs through its initial loan before it achieves a marketable product, it simply fails. However, if a firm manages to push its design into the region where customers are buying, it is a new ball game. Now funds from revenues can be invested in R&D.
Within this model, all firms determine price by setting a constant 'markup' (the same for all firms) over production costs. In turn, the gross margin over production costs is used to cover several things.
This money is used, first of all, to repay its outstanding debt to venture
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Box 2 Firms' Finance, R&D and Pricing Decisions
In this model, firms' finances play a major role. In the absence of a sufficient endowment of R&D funds, firms inevitably fail without ever breaking into either segment of the computer market. Firms that do break into the market may fail nevertheless, because their profits do not sustain the levels of R&D effort required to stay competitive. An investor willing to throw in arbitrarily large amounts of money in support of the R&D of some firm could in principle count on 'winning' in market share terms, but not necessarily in terms of getting his money back.
Firms are born with different, randomly selected initial budgets, IB, which are used to finance an R&D project, the length of which is fixed and equal for all firms. During this initial time, in each period firms spend a constant fraction of their budget on R&D. If the funds are exhausted before a marketable design is achieved, firms exit. Otherwise, firms start to spend a constant fraction σ (15% for all firms in this version of the model) of their profits in each period to pay back their debt D t to investors-that is to say, the initial budget capitalized at the current interest rate, r, until the debt has been fully paid back. What is left is used to invest in R&D and in advertising.
Profits, π are calculated in each period t as:
where M is the number of computers sold, p is the computer price and k is the production cost of a single computer. Production costs, k, are determined by the technical progress function. Price is obtained by adding a constant mark-up, µ, to costs:
R&D expenditures, R t , are simply determined as a constant fraction, φ, of what is left of gross profits, π t , after the repayment of the initial budget:
'History-friendly' Models of Industry Evolution capitalists. Fifteen per cent of gross profit is used for repayment, and repayment continues until the debt is eliminated (or the firm fails). At any time the debt owed to venture capitalists is the initial sum, capitalized at a prevailing rate, minus anything it already has paid back. Second, a firm spends a constant fraction of whatever is left from its gross profits, after debt repayment, on R&D and on advertising. (We will consider the effects of advertising in Section 3.3.) If the firm achieves a marketable product before the end of the time period over which it originally had planned to draw funds from its initial loan, the customary constant amount out of these funds add to the total the firm spends on these activities. If there is still something left from the gross margin after debt repayment, and expenditure on R&D and advertising, these residual earnings go into a firm's 'account' and are treated in this model as 'reserves'. These reserves will enter the model in an important way for transistor firms who have survived into the era when microprocessors have become available as an alternative component technology. We will consider what happens then in Sections 3.4 and 3.5, concerned with transition dynamics.
Market Dynamics
In our earlier discussion, we assumed that the greater the 'merit' of a machine, The variable φ is time-invariant and firm-specific, although in the simulations of this paper its value has been set equal for all firms.
Advertising expenditures, A, are calculated in a similar way, but it is assumed that the effect of advertising on sales follows a logistic curve. Specifically, the model first computes advertising expenditures, A * :
This value is then divided by a number that defines the amount of advertising expenditures beyond which the elasticity of sales to advertising is equal to zero (i.e. the asympote of the logistic curve). This ratio is then inserted into a logistic curve to yield the value of the variable A in the demand equation (equation 2). The excess gross profits after debt repayment, R&D expenditures and advertising is invested in an account, B t , that yields the interest rate, r, in each period.
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Box 3 Demand
An essential feature of the computer market is the existence of differentiated products and different market segments. The model incorporates some of these features of the demand side of the industry.
The industry is composed of different types of users who have different needs regarding the characteristics of computers. Moreover, demand behavior is influenced by informational considerations and by the advertising efforts of producers, as well as by the actual utility ofalternatives presented. 'Comparison shopping' is limited. Some customers may purchase computers that are far from the best on the market at the time, simply because, viewed in isolation, those computers are worth the asked price. Finally, bandwagon and brand loyalty effects may play an important role in determining the performance of individual firms.
First of all, the demand for computers is expressed as a demand for specific product characteristics in a Lancasterian vein. Let p be the price charged for a specific computer, then denote 'cheapness' by X 1 [= 1/p = 1/ k × (1 + µ)], and 'performance' by X 2 .
As discussed in the main text of the paper, computers are demanded by two different user groups, identified as 'big firms' and 'individuals'. They constitute, respectively, the mainframe market and the PC market. These users differ in their threshold requirements for the attributes of cheapness and performance, with individuals having more stringent minimum requirements for cheapness but less stringent requirements for performance than do big firms. The market activity of each type is represented by independent purchasing decisions by a large number of 'submarkets' of that type. Submarket buying behavior reflects the fact that computers are durable goods that deliver services over a period of time, and the demand facing producers is a demand for replacements or increments to the stock of such durables.
The number of submarkets in each main market (mainframes and PCs) is a parameter of the model. Individual submarkets buy computers if they do not have one-either because they have never bought one before or because of breakdowns. Computers have a finite life and surely break down after τ periods. The model keeps track of the average age, G, of the computers held by each submarket. In each period, a fraction G/τ of the submarkets experiences computer breakdowns and becomes 'History-friendly' Models of Industry Evolution ready to buy new computers. Moreover, submarkets buy computers if they 'see' the supply: when there are only few firms in the market, individual submarkets may not purchase any computers. The probability of buying a computer is equal to one if there are at least S firms selling in the marketplace. When there are only n < S firms, the probability decreases proportionally.
A simple formulation of consumer preferences is the one used in the main text (equation 2). Consider a particular group of consumers. Define M as the 'level' of utility associated with a computer with particular attributes. Then, the utility of a computer with cheapness X 1 = 1/p and performance X 2 for the user class s is given by a Cobb-Douglas function with the arguments that measure the extent to which threshold requirements have been exceeded rather than the raw values of cheapness and performance themselves:
where b 0 is a scale parameter, and X 1 min and X 2 min are the threshold levels for cheapness and performance. The sum of the exponents in the utility function operates like a sort of generalized demand elasticity reflecting performance as well as price. Consider now some number of customer groups, say two. Let the (integer) number of computers of a particular character that potentially would be purchased by a specific group of customers (if no other competing products were offered in the market) correspond to the level of utility, M. This way, the utility function has a cardinal interpretation and is treated heuristically as a demand curve.
After some time, some firms will succeed in achieving a computer design that satisfies the minimum thresholds required by consumers in the mainframe market and will start selling their product on the market. At the beginning, the market is small, both because the utility delivered by computers is low (the industry is in its infancy and technology has not yet progressed very much) and because many consumers may not even perceive that these products are available (or they may not even realize that computers might be useful to them). As the quality of computers increases and as more and more firms enter the market, total demand grows as a consequence of both an increase in the number of consumers and an increase in the number of computers purchased by individual groups of customers.
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the greater the number of machines that will be purchased. We now propose to measure M by the number of machines that customers in a submarket (we shall define this concept shortly) will buy, if it is the only machine that meets market threshold requirements. We assume that M is a log linear function of the extent to which the attributes of that computer exceed threshold requirements in that market:
If threshold requirements are not met, M = 0. If there is more than one kind of computer that meets threshold requirements, our analysis of demand involves variables other than M. The appreciative story put forth by many scholars of the history of the industry to account for the sustained dominance of IBM in the mainframe market includes concepts like bandwagon effects or brand loyalty (or lock-in), as well as advertising. Thus history-friendly modeling needs to bring these in.
We thus divide each of our broad markets into a large number of submarkets, which the reader may associate with individual customers or homogeneous groups of them. The probability, P i , that any individual computer buyer or group of buyers will purchase a particular computer, i, is as follows:
Customers select different computer designs as a function of their relative utility, M i , as it results from the specific mix of price and performance characteristics (see equation 3 in the main text). However, various informational constraints, like bandwagon and brand-loyalty effects, affect customers' behavior. These are captured in a compact formulation by the effect of the variables measuring the firms' market shares and advertising.
In the absence of the bandwagon/brand-loyalty effect and of advertising, the demand module would behave similarly to a standard demand curve. Demand would converge to 'best value for the money', although in the limit a positive probability of survival for inferior computers always remains. Convergence is faster the higher the parameter c 1 . The consideration of brand loyalty and of the bandwagon effect changes this picture quite drastically, introducing inertia and forms of increasing returns.
c 0 is specified so that the sum of the probabilities adds to one. As noted, M denotes the 'merit' of a computer. m is the market share, in terms of the fraction of total sales revenues accounted for by that computer. Note that the market share variable can be interpreted either in terms of a bandwagon effect, or a (probabilistic) lock-in of customers who previously had bought machines of a particular brand. d 1 assures that computers that have just broken into the market, and have no prior sales, can attract some sales. A is the advertising expenditure of the firm producing the computer. d 2 performs here a similar role to d 1 for firms that have just broken into the market and have not yet invested in advertising.
Given that customers in a particular submarket buy a particular computer, M is the number they buy. Note the following. First, if there is only one computer that meets threshold requirements, each submarket will buy it with probability 1, and will buy M units of it, as we asserted earlier. Second, assume that there is more than one computer that passes the threshold. If c 1 is very high, and c 2 and c 3 are very low, virtually all the customers will buy the computer with the highest merit score. On the other hand, if c 1 is relatively low, or c 2 and c 3 are high, a higher merit computer may be 'out sold' by a rival computer that has the higher existing market share, or which has been advertised more intensively, or both.
Competition Between Technologies with 'Locked-in' Firms
Within this model, after a number of periods have gone by, and after a number of transistor firms have successfully entered the mainframe market, microprocessors come into existence. A number of new firms start out at point Z in Figure 1 , with funding provided by venture capitalists, just as earlier new firms had started out at that point using transistor technology. Some of these firms will fail before they get into a market. Others may succeed.
Notice that while existing transistor firms provide no 'barrier to entry' for microprocessor firms who have aimed their trajectory toward the PC market, the existence of established transistor firms in the mainframe market creates a significant barrier to entry. First of all, if a microprocessor firm achieves a design that meets threshold requirements in the mainframe market, that computer is in competition with existing transistor-based computers that already have achieved higher-than-threshold quality levels. Second, the extant transistor mainframe producers have acquired positive market share, and have 'History-friendly' Models of Industry Evolution engaged in significant advertising, and that further disadvantages a newcomer. It is an open question within this model whether a new microprocessor firm can survive in the mainframe market. If not, and if extant transistor firms cannot or do not switch over to making mainframes out of microprocessors, the potential in the mainframe market afforded by microprocessor technology will never be realized.
In fact, we know that microprocessor firms did enter the mainframe market, but did not fare well there, in part because extant mainframe firms themselves adopted microprocessor technologies. Further, some of those old mainframe firms, IBM in particular, then used microprocessor technology to try to enter the PC market. Thus there are two different kinds of transitional dynamics that need to be built into this model if it is to be 'history-friendly'. First, we must enable firms that are originally using one technology to switch over to another. Second, we must enable firms who are in one market to try to diversify into the other.
Transition Dynamics
We noted above our desire to capture in our model a number of aspects of the new understandings about dynamic firm competencies and competence 'lock-ins'. We have built into the model that firm competencies are 'cumulative': today's design efforts build on what was achieved yesterday. Firms tend to get better and better at the particular things they are doing. On the other hand, it is clear that firms often have a good deal of difficulty when they try to do significantly new things. Thus Tushman and Anderson (1986) and Henderson and Clark (1990) have documented the difficulty that firms often have in coping when the best technologies underlying their products change significantly. Quite often extant firms cannot switch over rapidly enough to counter the efforts of new firms using the new technology. Christensen and Rosenbloom (1994) have highlighted similar difficulties that extant firms have had in recognizing new markets when they opened up.
In our model, existing transistor-based mainframe firms are able to switch over to microprocessor technology for use in their mainframe designs, but this may be time consuming and costly for them. It is new firms that do the initial work of advancing computer design using microprocessors. The probability that an extant transistor firm will try to switch over is a function of two variables. The first is how far microprocessor computer designs have been pushed. The second is the closeness of a transistor firm to the technological possibility frontier defined by transistor technology. The former is clearly a signal to extant firms that 'there is a potentially powerful new technology out
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Box 4 Adoption of New Component Technologies and Diversification into New Markets
The model embodies the idea that the very cumulative and specific nature of the processes of learning and development of organizational competencies can make firms myopic to different technological and market contexts. Competencies that are valuable in one context may not be easily transferred and used in other problems and applications. Thus, firms may find it difficult to adapt to radical technological changes.
Adoption
A key question addressed by the model concerns the conditions at which transistor-based firms can adopt the new integrated circuit technology. The model assumes that adoption of the new technology by incumbents takes money and time, since accumulated competences and experience may not be entirely transferrable to the new technology and to the new market, and may even make adoption more difficult. Thus, successful firms in the transistor age have more money to invest in adoption but, to the extent that the microprocessor innovation is 'competencedestroying', they may find themselves at a disadvantage as compared to newcomers and younger transistor-based companies. The difficulty that incumbents face in adopting microprocessors is a key variable in determining the relative fortunes of incumbents and new entrants. Adoption of the new technology takes place in two steps. First, a firm must 'perceive' microprocessor technology. Perception is a stochastic process that depends on the current technological position of the potential adopter in relation to the technological frontier in transistors and on the progress realized by the new technology:
where P perc is the probability of perceiving microprocessor technology, z i is fraction of the transistor technological frontier covered by firm i and z mp is the fraction of the microprocessor frontier covered by the bestpractice microprocessor firm. The parameter λ measures the general difficulty of perceiving the new technology. Once firms have perceived the possibility of adoption, they have to 'History-friendly' Models of Industry Evolution invest in order to acquire the new technology. Adoption costs (C ad ) entail a fixed cost, F ad , equal for all firms, and the payment of a fraction q of firms' accumulated budget, linked to factors like the training of engineers and the like. Thus,
Firms whose budget does not cover the fixed costs or whose profit rate is negative cannot adopt microprocessors. Moreover, the competencedestroying nature of the new technology is captured by the notion that adoption implies that the experience accumulated on the old technology now counts much less. In the model, experience (T) is reduced by a factor which is a parameter of the model.
Once firms have adopted the new technology, they have access to the new technological frontier and can innovate faster. However, they maintain their original trajectory.
Diversification
As the market for PCs becomes large, mainframe companies may contemplate the opportunity to enter a rich and promising market. Diversification can take place only after the adoption of microprocessors. The incentive for diversification is a function of the size of the PC market, defined in terms of the number of computers sold, as compared to the mainframe market. Specifically, diversification becomes possible when the ratio between the size of the PC market and the size of the mainframe market is bigger than a threshold value, which is a parameter of the model.
The procedures governing diversification in the model mimic the actual strategy used by IBM to enter the PC market. In the model, the parent company founds a new division in an attempt to exploit the available competencies specific to PCs, rather than to apply its own competencies to the new market.
The new division inherits from the parent company a fraction of the budget, of technical capabilities and of advertising capabilities. The size of these fractions are all parameters of the model. The position of the new division in the design space is determined as the average merit of design prevailing in the PC market at the time diversification occurs. In
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there, and we may be in trouble if we don't adopt it'. The latter is an indication that 'we can't get much further if we keep on pushing along the same road'.
If an old transistor firm decides to switch over, it faces one significant disadvantage, but also has an advantage. The disadvantage is that the experience that got it to the forefront of transistor technology (recall equation 1) counts for little or nothing if it shifts over to microprocessor technology. Thus in its first efforts in microprocessor computer design, it will achieve only about the average for extant microprocessor-based mainframe firms. Further, it must incur a once and for all switchover cost in order to start designing, producing and marketing microprocessor-based mainframes. However, extant transistor firms have the advantage of large R&D budgets which, at a cost, they can switch over to working with the new technology, and a stock of accumulated earnings on which they can draw to cover any transition costs.
Once an old transistor mainframe firm has switched over to microprocessor technology, it is potentially open to it to diversify by designing and trying to sell computers on the PC market. Its old design trajectory will, in general, not be a good one to pursue if it wants to diversify into PCs. As noted, IBM diversified by setting up an entirely new division, and that is what we assume about diversification of mainframe producers into the PC market in this model.
The new division initially takes place roughly at the average of firms already selling in or aiming for the PC market. The new divisional firm also faces the disadvantage that there are already firms selling in the PC market, with designs that already exceed thresholds, positive market shares, established advertising budgets and experience in the PC market. However, the new divisional firm does have the advantage of being able to dip into the 'deep pockets' and resources of its mother firm, which can transfer a sizeable fraction of its extant R&D and advertising budgets to the new division. After the initial infusion of resources, the new PC branch firm is on its own. other words, the parent company exploits 'public knowledge' in the PC market and partly 'imitates' PC firms. The technical progress trajectory (i.e. the mix of engineers of the two types) is randomly recalculated. After birth, the new division behaves exactly as a new entrant, with independent products, profits and budget.
History-replicating and History-divergent Simulations
History-replicating Simulations
Start the model going, and it will generate a simulated history of computer technology and the computer industry. Under a wide range of parameter settings, at least some of the transistor firms that began their operation at the start of the simulated episode will achieve computer designs that will sell on the mainframe market. In general, several will, and they will compete with each other for sales in that market. At least a few of the microprocessor firms, which start out later, will get into the PC market, and some will get into the mainframe market. Faced with this competition, some of the existing transistor-based firms producing mainframes will switch over to microprocessor technology. Some will then go on to enter the PC market.
Some, but not all, of the parameter settings will lead to patterns of industry evolution that, in effect, 'replicate' the industry history being modeled. A dominant transistor-based firm (IBM) will emerge relatively quickly in the mainframe market. That firm will hold on to its large share of the market, even when new microprocessor firms enter that market and challenge it. Part of the reason the dominant firm holds on is that it shifts over to microprocessor technology in a relatively timely manner. That firm then diversifies into the PC market, and gains a non-trivial, but not a dominant share.
Economists who have studied the history of the computer industry have tended to identify the following as key factors. First, the early buyers of IBM equipment tended to feel themselves 'locked-in' to IBM for upgrades, extensions and renewal of their computer capacity, largely because of specialized software. This made entry of new firms difficult. In terms of our model, a firm that has a high market share in mainframes will, because of that, attract a significant share of new purchases. Second, by the time the new technology came along, computer design under the old technology was reasonably advanced, and the leader, IBM, responded rapidly to the availability of new technology. In terms of our model, soon after the first microprocessor firms enter the mainframe market, the dominant transistor firm in that market switches over to microprocessors. Third, IBM's massive resources enabled it quickly to mount an R&D and advertising effort sufficient for it to diversify and catch up with the earlier entrants into the PC market. However, because the PCs produced by a number of other companies were compatible with the software used by IBM PCs, there was no specific lock-in to IBM. And within the class of IBM compatibles, customers were quite sensitive to the merit of the computers being offered, particularly to price. In terms of our 'History-friendly' Models of Industry Evolution model, in the PC market the coefficient on quality was high, and the coefficient on specific market share was low.
History-divergent Simulations
Our program of 'history-friendly' modeling obviously involves trying to get some runs that 'replicate', in a stylized manner, the actual industry history. However, once a set of 'history-replicating' parameters is identified, it involves, as well, changing the parameters that correspond to the key causal factors that analysts have put forth as behind the observed patterns, to see if, when these are changed, quite different patterns emerge. In this case, therefore, we are encouraged to try the following experiments, after a 'historyfriendly' replication base case has been achieved.
First, reduce the coefficient on market share in the demand equations for mainframes, to see if this will damp down the tendency of a dominant firm to emerge and hold on in the face of new stringent competition. Second, have firms using microprocessor technology enter the mainframe market earlier, before a dominant firm has emerged, and make transistor firms more sluggish in shifting over to microprocessors, and make it more costly for them to do so. Third, make demand in the PC market more sensitive to advertising, and less sensitive to computer quality, so that a deep-pockets company diversifying into PCs from mainframes has a chance of quickly grabbing a large share of the PC market.
The Simulation Runs
The Basic Case: History Replication
Simulation models are inherently complex. Simulation techniques are used when the model to be developed is not simple enough to be well posed in a form that admits analytic solution. However, we have tried to keep ours understandable. As a result, we were able to find a set of parameter values that 'replicated' the historical experience. We provide below a set of figures that summarize the behavior of our simulation model with parameters set in a 'history-friendly' way.
First, we provide some pictures of a typical run at various stages in the history of industry: early in the history when a few 'transistor' firms are just breaking into the mainframe market; somewhat later when one or several transistor firms were well established in that market but several new 'History-friendly' Models of Industry Evolution 'microprocessor' firms were breaking into it, and several microprocessor firms were entering the PC market; and still later when several of the old transistor firms had shifted over to microprocessor technology, and a couple had diversified into the PC market. 
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at the end of the line signifies that firm has failed. Breaks in a line indicate a change in the technology used by a firm. These figures depict single runs. 
We did 50 runs for each parameter setting. Figure 6 traces the time path of the Herfindahl Index of concentration in the mainframe market averaged over those 50 runs. Given the various random elements in our model, while there was considerable variation from run to run, most runs told a similar story. Transistor firms began to get into the mainframe market around period 30, and a dominant firm quickly emerged. The dip in the concentration ratio beginning around period 60 and its rise again several periods later was also quite common in the runs. This pattern reflects the surge of entry into the mainframe market of new 'microprocessor' firms at the beginning of the dip, and the relatively quick switchover to microprocessors and recovery of market share of the dominant mainframe firm. Figure 6 also depicts the time path of the Herfindahl Index in the PC market. As one can see, concentration in that market is much lower than concentration in the mainframe market. That is partly due to the fact that there are more 'startup' microprocessor firms, many of which enter the PC market, than earlier there were transistor startup firms that entered the mainframe market. But that clearly is only part of the story.
The new microprocessor firms could and did enter the mainframe market as well as the PC market. However, in the mainframe market this did not result in sustained effective competition. This fact is depicted in Figure 7 , which shows the time path of the number of different kinds of firms in the mainframe market. As can be seen, while several new microprocessor firms enter around period 60, on average only three remain in the market for any length of time. As Figure 8 (which depicts the number of different kinds of firms in the PC market) shows, significantly more firms that start out with microprocessor technology survive in the PC market, at least until around period 80 when 'IBM' establishes a PC branch.
As shown in Figure 8 , around period 80 the 'startup' microprocessor firms in the PC market are joined by a branch of the dominant mainframe company, which had earlier switched over to microprocessor technology, and then subsequently entered the PC market. In general, this 'offshoot of IBM' was quite successful in the PC market, but never achieved the dominance there that the firm held in the mainframe market. All this is depicted in Figure 9 .
The demand equation in runs that generated this 'history-replicating' pattern had a relatively high coefficient on 'market share' in the mainframe market, and a lower one in the PC market. Thus the first firm that achieved a considerable share in the mainframe market was more advantaged than the first firm to achieve considerable market share in the PC market. Microprocessor technology came into existence only after a large firm had emerged in the mainframe market, and it was not too difficult for that firm 'History-friendly' Models of Industry Evolution to switch over to microprocessors once it was challenged. And its ability to marshall R&D resources and advertising to enter the PC market enabled it relatively quickly to overcome its initial technological lag, but the effectiveness of these investments was not so great as to enable it to come to dominate that market. 
Variations: History-divergent Runs
We stressed above that testing the logic of an appreciative theory called for two things. One was demonstration that a stylized formal model incorporating that theory could generate the observed historical patterns. The other was that incorporation in that model of parameter settings that are counter to those argued as strongly causal in the appreciative theory should yield 'history-divergent' results. Here we describe the workings of the model where we tried first to avoid the rise of a dominant firm in the mainframe market and second to get 'IBM' to come to dominate the PC market.
As we noted earlier, the sustained dominance of IBM in the PC market has been ascribed to two different kinds of factors. One is the importance of 'repeat buying' and lock-in. The other is that IBM achieved dominance in the market before potential 'competence-destroying' new technology emerged, and further, IBM actually was able to take aboard that technology relatively quickly. Figure 10 shows the time paths of the Herfindahl Index in the mainframe market when the exponent on market share in the demand equation is significantly lower (respectively 0, 0.25 and 0.5) than its setting in our base model case. All other parameter settings are the same as in the base model. Notice how the concentration in the market, which largely reflects the share of the leading firm, declines with the reduction in the extent of customer lock-in. Figure 11 depicts the Herfindahl Index in the mainframe market for runs in which microprocessor startup firms emerged before IBM was able to dominate the mainframe market, and in which transistor firms had great difficulty in switching over to microprocessor technology, under two different parameter settings regarding the importance of market share in demand-the first as in the base case, the other with zero exponent on the market share in the demand equation. Notice that in both cases, the Herfindahl index significantly decreases.
The initial budget plays a major role in the survival of entrants. When the initial budget for microprocessor firms is smaller, simulation results (not reported here) show that a smaller number of entrants enter the PC market and no one enters the mainframe market. In addition, the adoption and diversification processes by mainframe firms start later.
The effect of entry on adoption and diversification by established firms is even more evident in the case of no microprocessor-PC start up. Simulation results (not reported here) show that without new entrants established mainframe firms do not adopt microprocessor technology nor they open up the new PC market (which as a consequence does not take off). Figure 12 depicts the share held by transistor firms and microprocessor 'History-friendly' Models of Industry Evolution 'History-friendly' Models of Industry Evolution firms in the mainframe market under the standard setting and the case in which the exponent on the market share in the demand equation is equal to zero. In this case the share of 'IBM' diminishes and the share of microprocessor firms increases in the mainframe market.
We turn now to attempts at history-divergent modeling of events in the PC market. In particular, we explore what might have happened if IBM's ability to shift large amounts of resources into R&D and advertising in that market had been even more effective than it was in our base case. That is, we try a set of runs in which the coefficient on R in equation (1) is higher and the coefficient on T is lower than in the base case, and in which the coefficient on A in equation (3) is significantly higher than in the base case (set 01). Then we try another set of runs in which (in addition to the changes in parameters stated above) diversification for IBM is easier in terms of cost and ability to bring a large advertising budget from the mainframe to the PC market (set 02). As Figure 13 shows, the first change alone makes little difference for the structure of the PC market. However, when IBM is able to diversify easily or more forcefully, it comes to dominate that market as well as the market for mainframes.
Conclusions
In this paper we have taken a body of verbal appreciative theorizing, developed a formal representation of that theory, and found that the formal version of that theory is consistent and capable of generating the stylized facts that the appreciative theory purports to explain. Going through this analytic exercise has significantly sharpened our theoretical understanding of the key factors behind salient aspects of the evolution of the computer industry.
We expect two types of reaction to this paper. One is that the 'theory' presented here lacks elegance and generality, and scarcely deserves the term 'theory' at all: useful theory in economics needs to be at a much higher level of abstraction. To this complaint we would reply that most of what economists know about the economic world comes in the form of relatively detailed knowledge about particular contexts, like the pattern of evolution of the computer industry, and much of our 'theorizing' is about those particular contexts. General-purpose theory provides some broad useful conceptions, and a class of models from which the analyst can pick and choose, but as any economist who has tried to understand a particular empirical problem, or come up with a policy prescription that is not laughed out of court by those who know the context, the devil is in the details. And the kind of theorizing that makes sense of the details is derived by paying attention to them.
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The details of the industry history we have tried to model are interesting and important to explain, as well as being complex. In particular, in the face of significant changes in the basic underlying technologies, the previously dominant firm was not dislodged from the market where it had been the leader, but was unable to capture the major share of the new market that the new technology opened up. An explanation for this somewhat complicated pattern requires a model of some complexity. It is striking that a model which can explain it is as transparent as it is.
We are not arguing here against economic theorizing at a higher level of abstraction. Indeed much of the earlier work of some of us in evolutionary theory has been quite abstract and general. However, we are arguing here for the importance of theory that is close to the empirical details, or rather to the appreciative theory used by knowledgeable empirical scholars to explain those details. We believe that a major advantage of evolutionary economic theory is that it is capable of formulation at this latter level (close to the 'appreciative accounts') as well as in a more abstract mode.
Another reaction to this paper that we expect is 'big deal'. The verbal model that the formal model aims to capture was well conceived and developed, and it is scarcely surprising, or useful, that a formal representation of it 'works'. And the exercise in formal modeling adds very little, if anything, to the appreciative theory. In response, we would begin by agreeing that carefully developed appreciative verbal theory generally avoids inconsistencies, and can explain what it purports to. But sometimes the logic is incomplete or flawed, and, even when it is not, a lot can be learned about what is essential and what is not in the verbal account by trying to build and run a formal representation. More generally, by building and working through a formal model of the verbal account, some results can be brought into view that had not been seen clearly before. We think this definitely was the case here.
In this particular instance, the formal modeling helps to see more clearly at least three important matters: the characteristics of demand, adoption and diversification, and entry. The first regards the major role of demand in affecting market structure and the rate of technological advance. The model clearly separates the role of frictions, inertia and lock-ins in existing demand from emergence of a new demand and a new market. Frictions at the demand level are a powerful reason for the persistency of advantages of incumbent firms. In this respect they play a greater role than the cumulativeness of technical advance at the firm level. On the contrary the emergence of new demand with new features reduces concentration in the overall industry and decreases the advantages of incumbent firms.
The second issue regards the consequences for firms of the advent of a new 'History-friendly' Models of Industry Evolution technology and a new market. A new technology and a related new market throw up two different kinds of challenges for incumbent firms: one regarding adoption, the other diversification. The first relates to the use and master of the new technology by established firms. The second concerns the ability by established firms to see and effectively get into the new markets that the new technology opens up. The observed body of history and our model tells us that in this case at least the second task was more difficult than the first. The third issue that the building and running of the formal model highlights is the important role of entry conditions. Not only do new firms open up and develop new markets. They also stimulate incumbent firms to adopt and diversify earlier. Because our simulations refer mostly to the US industry, it is fair to say that the US venture capital market played a major role in generating the history that occurred and enabled new firms to enter, move fast and get established in the new market, thus allowing the new market to take off rapidly. As a consequence of this, international industrial leadership remained with US firms, although the identity of those firms changed. While we did not attempt in this particular model to deal explicitly with what happened outside the USA, our model suggests that, in the absence of strong entrepreneurship and a venture capital market, Europe and Japan were unable to take advantage of new technologies and the opening of new markets which leveled the playing field, and to have new firms becoming leaders in the new market.
We conclude by noting that these insights, gained from our model, are associated with the explicitly evolutionary nature of that model. Firms try different things, the market selects upon them, and selection takes time. This is a very different theory about firm and industry behavior than the one that presumes that firms always correctly maximize, and the market is always in equilibrium. An essential part of the evolutionary story we have developed here is that firms differed in their level and types of competencies, in their trajectory of advancement and in their ability to see the new market. Another essential part is that entry conditions and financial institutions backing new firms have major consequences on the specific evolution of the industry. In short, technological and industrial change must be understood as an evolutionary process.
